Peter Turchin
I hope that this book will convince you that this view is wrong. A science of history is not only possible but also useful: it helps us anticipate how the collective choices we make in the present can bring us a better future.
* focused on cycles of political integration and disintegration, particularly on state formation and state collapse. This is the area where our field’s findings are arguably the most robust—and arguably the most disturbing... complex societies everywhere are affected by recurrent and, to a certain degree, predictable waves of political instability, brought about by the same basic set of forces, operating across the thousands of years of human history.
we were due for another sharp instability spike by the early 2020s.
* stagnating or declining real wages (wages in inflation-adjusted dollars), a growing gap between rich and poor, overproduction of young graduates with advanced degrees, declining public trust, and exploding public debt, these seemingly disparate social indicators are actually related to each other dynamically. Historically, such developments have served as leading indicators of looming political instability. In the United States, all of these factors started to take an ominous turn in the 1970s.
The problem is that the historical record is rich, and each pundit can easily find cases in it to support whichever side of a policy debate they favor. Clearly, inference from such “cherry-picked” examples is not the way to go. <> Cliodynamics is different. It uses the methods of data science, treating the historical record, compiled by generations of historians, as Big Data.
the New Deal era: for roughly fifty years the interests of workers and the interests of owners were kept in balance in this country, such that overall income inequality remained remarkably low. <> This social contract began to break down in the late 1970s... the fruits of economic growth were reaped by the elites. A perverse “wealth pump” came into being, taking from the poor and giving to the rich. The Great Compression reversed itself. In many ways, the past forty years resemble what happened in the United States between 1870 and 1900.
* the extra wealth flowing to the elites (to the proverbial “1 percent,” but even more so to the top 0.01 percent) eventually created trouble for the wealth holders (and power holders) themselves. The social pyramid has grown top-heavy. We now have too many “elite aspirants” competing for a fixed number of positions in the upper echelons of politics and business. In our model, such conditions have a name: elite overproduction. Together with popular immiseration, elite overproduction, and the intraelite conflicts that it has engendered, has gradually undermined our civic cohesiveness
Ten-percenters (roughly, millionaires in today’s dollars) have a lot of power over their own lives. One-percenters (roughly, decamillionaires) have a lot of power over other people’s lives. Centimillionaires and billionaires wield even more power.
Then a chair is removed, and another round is played. At the end, there is one winner. In Evita, the winner is Colonel Juan Perón, who later in the musical (as in real life) becomes president of Argentina and founder of the Peronist Party. <> In the elite aspirant game, or the aspirant game, for short, instead of reducing the number of chairs each round, we increase the number of players... For example, you can slow down by a chair or even stop and wait right next to it for the music to stop, while shoving away other contenders. Congratulations, you have just become a counter-elite—someone who is willing to break the rules to get ahead in the game. Unfortunately, others quickly catch on, and each chair soon acquires a jostling crowd, and before long you have the recipe for a free-for-all fistfight. This turns out to be a good model for understanding the consequences of elite overproduction in real life.
An even better metric for following the effect of overproduction of wealth holders on elections is the cost of running a successful campaign... the average spending of the House winner increased from $400K in 1990 to $2.35 million in 2020, while the same statistic for the Senate started at $3.9 million (in 1990) and grew to $27 million in the last electoral round.
* An additional sign of growing popular discontent was the rise of populist parties, such as the anti-immigration Know-Nothing Party. <> Another related factor in Lincoln’s rise, and the Civil War that his election triggered, was elite overproduction. After 1820, most of the gains from the growing economy went not to the workers but to the elites;... The new millionaires chafed under the rule of the Southern aristocracy, as their economic interests diverged from the established elites. The new elites, who made their money in manufacturing, favored high tariffs to protect budding American industries and state support for “internal improvements” (turnpike, canal, and railroad construction)... History textbooks tell us that the American Civil War was fought over slavery, but this is not the whole story. A better way to characterize this conflict is to say that it was fought over “slavocracy.”
Taiping: Popular immiseration together with elite overproduction is an explosive combination. Immiserated masses generate raw energy, while a cadre of counter-elites provides an organization to channel that energy against the ruling class.
the crisis severity is variable. Despite this variability, the time of troubles always comes. So far, we haven’t seen an exception to this rule. No society that my team has studied had an integrative phase lasting more than around two hundred years.
* Our analysis points to four structural drivers of instability: popular immiseration leading to mass mobilization potential; elite overproduction resulting in intraelite conflict; failing fiscal health and weakened legitimacy of the state; and geopolitical factors. The most important driver is intraelite competition and conflict, which is a reliable predictor of the looming crisis.
Toward 1300, however, the brilliance of the French kingdom began to tarnish. The golden age turned into a gilded age. While elite opulence continued unabated, the living conditions of common people deteriorated. The root cause of popular immiseration was the massive population boom in Western Europe in the two centuries before 1300... the demographic catastrophe had another, more subtle but nevertheless devastating effect on social stability by making the social pyramid unsustainably top-heavy. After 1250, the number of nobles increased even faster than that of the general population.. In other words, massive overpopulation during the thirteenth century created a wealth pump that enriched landowners at the expense of peasants.
Again, we find that cycles of collective violence tend to recur during the disintegrative phases, with a roughly fifty-year periodicity. The Late Medieval Crisis in France was not an exception. <> As the new generation of leaders replaced the one that had firsthand experience of the state collapse in the 1350s, they repeated the mistakes of their elders. Two aristocratic factions, the Burgundians and the Orleanists, battled for the capital, massacring each other in turn.. in 1415 another English king, Henry V, entered the fray. History repeated itself with a catastrophic defeat of the French army at Agincourt, which was a close replay of the Battle of Crécy. It is eerie how closely the second collapse of the French state followed the trajectory of the first.
At the same time, the memory of the dark period of social breakdown and the external pressure from the English forged a new feeling of national unity among the elites. In this new climate of intraelite cooperation, it proved to be possible to reform state finances and provide France with a solid fiscal foundation for generations ahead.
Historians of China see a similar pattern, which they call the dynastic cycles. Between 221 BC and 1912, from the Qin dynasty to the Qing dynasty, China was repeatedly unified (and reunified) and governed effectively for a while. Then moral corruption set in, bringing decline and fragmentation. As the Chinese historical novel Romance of the Three Kingdoms says, “The empire, long divided, must unite; long united, must divide. Thus it has ever been.” Historians of ancient Egypt also divide its history into the Old Kingdom, the Middle Kingdom, and the New Kingdom, each followed by the First, Second, and Third Intermediate Periods.
When France broke down in the 1350s, all the English surplus elites—and there were huge numbers of them in England, just as in France—followed their king across the Channel. Some of them were killed in the fighting, but the majority found that the French wars were an exceedingly lucrative business... In other words, England exported its surplus elites—and instability—to France.
When France broke down again in the early fifteenth century and another English king entered the fray in 1415, the hordes of impoverished elites flowed back across the Channel after him... It’s like societies have a cultural stencil plate for state collapse—the French way or the English way, as the case may be. England’s trajectory after 1415 was another example of this curious pattern. As before, things went well for the English—for a while. Instability was successfully exported to France, and there were no significant disturbances in England between 1415 and 1448. However, as the French successfully reconquered their country around 1450, increasing numbers of English surplus elites had to return home. The current king, Henry VI, was unfit to rule, and the Royal Council governed in his name. The leadership of the Lancastrian faction fell to Margaret of Anjou...And in 1455, the Wars of the Roses broke out,
During the integrative phase, every other generation saw a baronial rebellion against the crown, but compared to the Wars of the Roses, those rebellions were more like armed demonstrations intended to impress baronial demands on the king. The rebellion of 1215–1217, for example, was resolved by the king signing the Magna Carta to satisfy the mutinous elites. In the Wars of the Roses, the goal of each side was the extermination of the enemy.
* In England we have a useful quantitative proxy to trace this trend, because drinking wine (rather than ale) was one marker of elite status. At the peak of their fortunes, English elites imported and consumed twenty thousand tuns of wine from Gascony. By the end of the Wars of the Roses, fewer than five thousand tuns were imported, and wine imports did not start recovering until after 1490. The implied fourfold decline in English elite numbers parallels the estimated fourfold decrease in the French nobility by the end of their own age of discord.
the Age of Revolutions arrived in England in 1830, while in France, of course, it was kicked off by the Storming of the Bastille in 1789. In short, France and England behaved like two dangling weights, swinging back and forth within the same period but one lagging behind the other.
* Extensive polygamy, the practice of marrying many spouses, was also the rule for steppe pastoralists, such as the Mongols. As a result, these societies churned out elite aspirants at a frightening rate. The faster the pace at which elite overproduction develops, the shorter the integrative phases.
Take the General Crisis of the seventeenth century, which was Eurasia-wide. Why did the English Civil War, the Time of Troubles in Russia, and the collapse of the Ming dynasty in China happen at roughly the same time?... The Great Famine coincided with a trough in solar activity known as the Wolf Minimum (1280–1350). Most climatologists agree that lower solar activity produces cooler global temperatures... In my view, external forcing due to climate fluctuations is not a direct cause of social breakdown. Its effect is more subtle. Here’s where metronomes swinging in odd sympathy can help... The second synchronizing force, contagion, is even more potent than external forcing. Cliodynamic analysis indicates that major epidemics
Rural unemployment coupled with urban demand for labor (in crafts and trades but also as servants for the wealthy) generates a population flow toward the cities, which grow much faster than the general population during this period. The elite demand for luxury goods drives long-distance trade. <> These trends make the appearance of new diseases and the spread of existing ones more likely... As a result, societies that are approaching a crisis are very likely to be hit by an epidemic. But the causality also flows in the opposite direction. A major epidemic undermines societal stability. Because the poor suffer greater mortality than the elites,
Before the Arab Spring of 2010, there was the Springtime of Nations in 1848. It started in Italy in January but was little noticed at the time. The most influential event was the February Revolution in France, which inspired uprisings in Germany, Denmark, and Sweden in March.
-----------
The distinguished economists Anne Case and Angus Deaton recently used these statistics to discover a highly troubling trend in this measure of well-being. They found that life expectancy at birth for white Americans fell by one-tenth of a year between 2013 and 2014. In the next three years, life expectancy fell for the US population as a whole. Mortality at all ages rose, but the most rapid increase happened to white Americans in midlife.
* In the 1970s, a new generation of elites began replacing the “great civic generation.”[27] The new elites, who didn’t experience the turbulence of the previous age of discord, forgot its lessons and started to gradually dismantle the pillars on which the postwar prosperity era was based. The ideas of neoclassical economics, previously held by fringe economists, now became mainstream.[28] The Reagan presidency of the 1980s was the turning point when the idea of cooperation between workers and businesses was abandoned.
Recent new papers by economists provide strong evidence for the importance of nonmarket forces in explaining the wage declines of American workers... wage suppression between 1979 and 2017 was due to a shifting balance of power, not to automation and technological changes. 1. Austerity macroeconomics, including facilitating unemployment higher than it needed to be to keep inflation in check, and responding to recessions with insufficient force; 2. Corporate-driven globalization, ...
By 2016, then, the American population had sorted itself out into two social classes: the educated and the “immiserated”
Today an advanced degree is not a perfect, or even reasonably effective, defense against precarity.
History (and CrisisDB) tells us that the credentialed precariat (or, in the jargon of cliodynamics, the frustrated elite aspirant class) is the most dangerous class for societal stability. Overproduction of youth with advanced degrees has been the most significant factor in driving societal upheavals, from the Revolutions of 1848 to the Arab Spring of 2011. Interestingly, different professions have different propensities for producing revolutionary leaders. You might not think of a teacher as a likely revolutionary,... The most dangerous occupation, however, appears to be the legal profession. Robespierre, Lenin, and Castro were lawyers. So were Lincoln and Gandhi
The problem is that in today’s climate, when ideology has been “weaponized” by rival elite factions, any discussion of it is like entering a minefield. A more conceptual difficulty in studying the role of ideology in societal breakdown is that the cognitive content of ideologies espoused by rival elite factions is highly variable over time and between different parts of the world. During the European civil wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the defining feature of ideological battles was religion, as, for example, Huguenots versus Catholics in the French Wars of Religion.
A nearly universal feature of precrisis periods is thus the fragmentation of the ideological landscape and the breakdown of elite ideological consensus that underlies routine acceptance of state institutions.
although the US was an avowed capitalist country (and repressed the Communist Party), in practice it was a social democratic or even socialist country along the lines of the Nordic model. The Postwar Consensus included... A low-immigration regime
* those on the right gain a signal advantage once they graduate. This advantage is their capacity to mobilize support among the working-class (less educated) voters. A common situation during crisis periods is that of elite political entrepreneurs who use the high mass mobilization potential of the non-elite population to advance their ideological agendas and political careers. A great historical example is Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus, who founded the populist party (populares in Latin) in late republican Rome.
As of 2022, we are clearly in transition from the precrisis phase, when the state is still struggling to maintain control of the ideological landscape in the face of a multitude of counter-elite challengers, to the next phase, when numerous contenders struggle among themselves for primacy... Many observers were taken aback by the intensity of the “cancel culture” that appeared seemingly out of nowhere. But such vicious ideological struggles are a common phase in any revolution.
In order for stability to return, elite overproduction somehow needs to be taken care of—historically and typically by eliminating the surplus elites through massacre, imprisonment, emigration, or forced or voluntary downward social mobility. In America today, the losers are treated in milder ways, at least so far.
* Early states were usually governed by militocracies, whose main source of social power was simply force.
Understanding this, early warrior elites sought to control ideological power by appointing themselves as priests, or by thoroughly controlling religion specialists. Many early states were ruled by priest-kings, or even by god-kings. Egyptian pharaohs, for example, were worshipped as gods. The rulers of early states also added economic power to the mix. Because the main means of production in preindustrial societies was land—for growing food and fiber and for raising livestock—they set themselves up as landowners... But once you have a million or more subjects, you either acquire a civil service or suffer from such inefficiencies that your polity sooner or later collapses.
the Mamluks maintained their grip on Egypt for nearly three centuries. They accomplished this feat by forbidding the sons of Mamluks to inherit their fathers’ positions. Instead, they continued to purchase boys originating from Central Asia and the Caucasus on the slave market and train them as soldiers, officers, and ultimately rulers. Whether intentionally or not, avoiding elite overproduction made the Mamluk regime particularly stable. To give you an idea of how effective the Mamluks were, consider that they were the only military force that managed to stop the Mongols.. Unfortunately for the Mamluks, they failed to modernize their army. Their cavalry was excellent, but they lagged in adopting gunpowder weapons. As a result, in 1517, Egypt was conquered by the nearest “gunpowder empire”—the Ottomans.
the general pattern. From the twelfth century, Egypt was ruled by a succession of military elites. As soon as the ruling elite lost its control of military power, it was replaced by another set of warriors... (Arab Spring) Had Gamal succeeded his father as ruler of Egypt, it would have amounted to a social revolution in which the old military elites were replaced by the new economic elites... When the army overthrew Morsi, the economic elites returned to the army-business coalition as a junior partner. The end result of the 2011–2014 crisis was that Egypt returned to a traditional—for it, at least—power configuration,
* China. Unlike Egypt (and the USA), for more than two millennia, China has been governed by elites for whom the primary source of power is administrative. In other words, by bureaucracies. China’s ruling class was recruited through an elaborate system of local and imperial examinations.
Plutocracies have also been rare in history. Well-known historical examples include such Italian merchant republics as Venice and Genoa, as well as the Dutch Republic. Today the best example of a plutocracy is the United States of America.
* An influential school of historical thought views the Civil War and its aftermath, Reconstruction, as the Second American Revolution, albeit an unfinished one. Although the Civil War freed the slaves, it utterly failed to produce racial equality. The main effect was thus the revolution at the top: the turnover of the elites... at the same time that the Civil War destroyed Southern wealth, it immensely enriched Northern capitalists. Supplying the Union war effort was even more profitable. “A surprising number of the commercial and financial giants of the late nineteenth century—J. P. Morgan, John D. Rockefeller, Andrew Carnegie, Jay Gould, Marshall Field, Philip Armour, Collis Huntington, and several other railroad grandees—were young Northerners who avoided military service, usually by buying substitutes, and used the war to take major steps up future fortune’s ladder,”
We can see this economic transformation reflected in the makeup of the Lincoln administration. This aspect of Lincoln’s career is not widely emphasized, but he practiced a lot of corporate law,.. Many members of his administration had strong railroad or financial ties.
Toward the end of the Gilded Age, the idea that unrestricted competition was injurious to all players became expressed more and more frequently by business leaders, including such titans as John D. Rockefeller and J. P. Morgan.[13] Their dislike of the resulting disorder and their pursuit of predictability resulted in the Great Merger Movement of 1895–1904. In most cases, these turn-of-the-century combinations were economically less efficient than the new rivals that appeared almost immediately. Their main benefits, however, were not in increasing economic efficiency but in increasing the political power of business.
Another important development, which took place later (around 1920), was the coalescence of what the political scientist G. William Domhoff calls the “policy-planning network,”.. The bulk of the money came from just three members of the economic elite: the steel magnate Andrew Carnegie, the oil baron John D. Rockefeller, and a wealthy St. Louis merchant, Robert Brookings.
Simply put, at the top of the power pyramid in America is the corporate community:
* nearly two thousand policy issues between 1981 and 2002... Statistical analysis of this remarkable data set showed that the preferences of the poor had no effect on policy changes. This is not entirely unexpected. What is surprising is that there was no—zilch, nada—effect of the average voter.
Another consideration is that this analysis addressed only what political scientists call the “first face of power”: the ability of citizens to shape policy outcomes on contested issues. But the “second face of power,” shaping the agenda of issues that policy makers consider, is a subtle but extremely powerful way for the elites to get their way. Finally, the “third face of power” is the ability of ideological elites to shape the preferences of the public... My favorite example of its effectiveness is the “death tax” meme
* There is E-Verify, a Department of Homeland Security website that allows businesses to determine the work statuses of potential employees, but no federal mandate requires employers to use it... Yet one has to wonder when a solution that involves spending billions of dollars on border security and detention of migrants is implemented—with imperfect results, to say the least—but a solution that involves cutting off the money that draws migrants to this country in the first place has never been adopted. Cui bono, as the Romans used to say.
it is easy to see why the Left wants to defend illegal migrants against being targeted and victimized. And it should. But acting on the correct moral impulse to defend the human dignity of migrants, the Left has ended up pulling the front line too far back, effectively defending the exploitative system of migration itself.
* My statistical analysis of long-term data trends indicates that immigration has been a significant contributor to the stagnation/decline of wages in the United States over the past several decades, particularly for workers without college educations... There is a reason why the greatest surge of immigration in American history in the late nineteenth century coincided with the first Gilded Age, the period of extreme income inequality and popular immiseration comparable only to our own... There is a reason why the greatest surge of immigration in American history in the late nineteenth century coincided with the first Gilded Age, the period of extreme income inequality and popular immiseration comparable only to our own.
There is no getting around the fact that the power of unions relies by definition on their ability to restrict and withdraw the supply of labor, which becomes impossible if an entire workforce can be easily and cheaply replaced. Open borders and mass immigration are a victory for the bosses.
* Today’s well-intentioned activists have become the useful idiots of big business. With their adoption of “open borders” advocacy—and a fierce moral absolutism that regards any limit to migration as an unspeakable evil—any criticism of the exploitative system of mass migration is effectively dismissed as blasphemy.
During the next four centuries, this geopolitical landscape was utterly reshaped. First, the total number of states in Europe was drastically cut down, from more than five hundred to just about thirty. Second, most of the plutocracies went extinct and were swallowed up by militocracies. The reason? Three words: the Military Revolution.
The early American Republic was an oligarchy modeled after the United Kingdom, although without a monarch (who, by that point, was on the way to becoming just a figurehead in the British Empire anyway). As a result, the United States inherited plutocracy as part of its “cultural genotype.”
it took sixty years for Danish social democrats to transition from counter-elites to established elites... In 1933, Stauning negotiated the Kanslergade Agreement, which laid down the foundations of what became known as the Nordic model. The key feature of the Nordic model is tripartite cooperation between labor, business, and government, working together for the common good.
* the Democratic Party of the FDR period can be thought of as a party of the working class, we must add an important qualification. It was a party of the white working class. In order to push his agenda through, FDR had to make a devil’s bargain with the Southern elites, which essentially made the South immune from the tripartite bargain among workers, business, and government that the FDR administration forged. In particular, the segregationist regime in the South was left untouched. Black workers, especially in the South, were excluded from the social contract of the New Deal.
Heather Cox Richardson writes in How the South Won the Civil War: So the original American paradox of freedom based on inequality was reestablished. That restoration relegated people of color to inequality, but it also undercut the ability of oligarchs to destroy democracy. Black and brown people were subordinate, so wealthy men could not convincingly argue that they were commandeering government to redistribute wealth and destroy liberty. With that rhetoric defanged, white Americans used the government to curb wealth and power.
The gradual expansion of the social contract to include Black workers, however, provided an opening for those plutocrats who were unhappy with America as a quasi-Nordic country in which their power was constrained by the other two interest groups: workers and the state. They used the Republican Party as a vehicle to push their own agenda... the “Southern strategy,” whose goal was to make the Republican Party the dominant party in the former Confederate states by appealing to Southern white voters using explicitly or implicitly racist issues.
King : And when his wrinkled stomach cried out for the food that his empty pockets could not provide, (Yes, sir) he ate Jim Crow, a psychological bird that told him that no matter how bad off he was, at least he was a white man, better than the black man.
* The worst incident in US labor history was the Battle of Blair Mountain (1921). Although it started as a labor dispute, it eventually turned into the largest armed insurrection in US history, other than the Civil War. Between ten thousand and fifteen thousand miners armed with rifles fought thousands of strikebreakers and sheriff’s deputies, called the Logan Defenders.
A key development in shutting down the wealth pump was the passage of the immigration laws of 1921 and 1924... Shutting down immigration reduced the labor supply and provided a powerful boost to real wages for many decades to come.
The prosocial policies during the Progressive and New Deal periods had to be paid for—and the costs were borne by the American ruling class. It is little appreciated just how much the economic elites had to give up to make it work. Between 1929 and the 1970s, top fortunes declined not only in relative terms (in comparison with median wealth) but also in absolute terms
The top wealth, then, was equivalent to the annual wages of twenty-five thousand workers. By 1912, when this indicator reached its first peak... It was equivalent to 2.6 million annual wages—two orders of magnitude (x100) greater! By 1982, when inflation had eroded the dollar even more, the richest American was Daniel Ludwig, whose $2 billion was equivalent to “only” ninety-three thousand annual wages.[14] <> This reversal of elite overproduction was similar in magnitude to the one that occurred in the aftermath of the Civil War,
Savva Morozov, one of the wealthiest industrialists in prerevolutionary Russia,[18] also couldn’t envision such a disastrous outcome. He was a noted philanthropist and patron of the arts... In a final ironic twist, her opulent country estate, Gorki (The Hills), became the main residence of the leader of the proletarian revolution, Vladimir Lenin.
Nero realized that it was time to end his life, but fleeing servants had stolen the poison needed to do it painlessly, and he couldn’t gather the courage to kill himself with a blade.
* Joseph Stalin, perhaps the most successful dictator of the twentieth century. Stalin rose to power and then ruled by carefully placing people who were personally loyal to him in key positions. Then he appointed another layer of loyalists to watch the first group. Then he periodically repressed key subordinates and replaced them with ambitious underlings. When Stalin joined the Bolshevik Party, Russia was suffering from a huge problem of elite overproduction,... Stalin had taken care of this problem by ruthlessly exterminating this elite “surplus.” He essentially created a pipeline for ambitious aspirants to enter the elite, progress up the ranks, and then be executed or sent to labor camps... His huge power came from his influence over the elites and the common people. But even more importantly, the structural forces were on his side. New research by economists has shown that despite the brutality of Stalin’s industrialization, the life of common people did get better during the 1930s, as hard as it may be to look past the millions of deaths from famine following mass agricultural collectivization.
Factionalism is “sharply polarized and uncompromising competition between blocs pursuing parochial interests at the national level. This winner-take-all approach to politics is often accompanied by confrontational mass mobilization,... Partial autocracies were intermediate in stability, and the remaining regime classes (partial democracies without factionalism, full democracies, and full autocracies) were relatively stable... Government repression of a minority group further elevates the chances that the minority will resort to arms.
Currently: Although Ukrainian oligarchs ruled the country unrestrained by any other internal checks, they did not become a cohesive ruling class. Instead, they formed several factions that struggled against each other using as weapons electoral politics, semilegal seizure of property, and even imprisonment.
In reality, the 2014 Ukrainian revolution was no more a people’s revolution than any other revolution in history. It was driven by the same forces that we have discussed in the pages of this book—popular immiseration and elite overproduction. The people didn’t gain as a result of this revolution. Ukrainian politics continued to be as corrupt as before.
A better conclusion is that not all states with the trappings of democracy are run for the benefit of broad segments of the population.
Thus, the heart of the MPF model is the relative wage and the wealth pump that it powers... The number of radicals in proportion to the total population, therefore, is a key variable that the MPF model needs to track. <> The process of radicalization works like a disease that, as it spreads, changes people’s behaviors and makes them act in violent ways... It is quite similar to equations used by epidemiologists—for example, in forecasting the dynamics of COVID outbreaks.
The MPF engine is a kind of “morality tale,” like the story of a kind girl and an unkind girl, a narrative motif that is present in hundreds of traditional societies... the most important insight from the MPF model is that it is too late to avert our current crisis. But we can avoid the next period of social breakdown in the second half of the twenty-first century, if we act soon to bring the relative wage up to the equilibrium level (thus shutting down elite overproduction) and keep it there.
One increasingly visible sign of polarization within the business community is the rise of charitable foundations pushing extreme ideological agendas. At one end of the spectrum are the ultraconservative foundations: Charles Koch, the Mercer Family, Sarah Scaife, and others. Domhoff calls them a “policy-obstruction network.”
In the end, it was an FBI agent who proposed they kidnap the governor of Michigan. Nearly half of the paramilitary group that planned to kidnap, put on trial, and execute Whitmer were feds or informers. It is ironic that the organizational vacuum on the far right is so extreme that this far-right terrorist group had to be organized by the FBI.
In order not to lose elections, the reasoning goes, the party needs to move to the center. The “center,” of course, is the policies favored by the ruling class. <> On the ideological front, left-wing dissidents get very different treatment depending on the content of their critiques. Cultural left issues—race, ethnicity, LGBTQ+, intersectionality—occupy large swaths of the corporate media. Populist economic issues and, especially, critique of American militarism, much less so.
Before 2016, the Republican Party was the stronghold of the ruling class, a vehicle for the 1 percent. But today, as I write this book, the Republicans are making a transition to becoming a true revolutionary party.
Some politicians on the right are pure culture warriors, while others focus on populist issues. Currently, the most interesting phenomenon, which may or may not turn out to be the crystallization nucleus, is that of Tucker Carlson. Carlson is interesting because he is the most outspoken antiestablishment critic operating within the corporate media.
As of late 2022, we have no way of knowing whether Carlson, Vance, and, more generally, NatCons will succeed in taking over the Republican Party. But the NatCons are clearly reshaping the GOP, building on what has already been accomplished by Trump and Bannon. As Jason Zengerle wrote in The New York Times, “Depending on your point of view, NatCons are either attempting to add intellectual heft to Trumpism or trying to reverse-engineer an intellectual doctrine to match Trump’s lizard-brain populism.”
We found that population declines are quite common—half of the exits from crisis resulted in a population loss. Thirty percent of exits were associated with a major epidemic.
England: The Chartist Period (1819–1867) The period is named after the 1838 People’s Charter, a formal document of protestation calling for these reforms... Yet major civil war or outright rebellion did not materialize... Part of the answer has to do with England benefiting from the resources afforded by its extensive empire... Many elite aspirants frustrated with the saturation of prestigious and powerful positions at home went overseas—some to positions in the colonial administration, others as private citizens... In response to unrest, a sizable fraction of the English political elite became persuaded of the need for several critical reforms. In 1832, the franchise was extended to smaller landowners and some urban residents. The Reform Act of 1832 also shifted the balance of power away from the landed gentry (the squirearchy) in favor of the upwardly mobile commercial elites by removing “rotten boroughs” (with tiny populations controlled by wealthy patrons) and turning major commercial and industrial cities into separate boroughs... One of the most important measures that alleviated immiseration was the repeal of the Corn Laws that had imposed tariffs on the import of grains, benefiting large landowners but inflating the price of staple food products in domestic markets.
Toward the end of the fifteenth century, the Muscovite state, the gentry, and the peasants forged a tripartite social contract, according to which the gentry would serve in the army, while the peasants would work to support these warriors and the state (which was minuscule, anyway, and staffed with gentry who were compensated in the form of land with peasants). Those gentry who couldn’t, or wouldn’t, serve had land (and peasants) taken away from them. This compact enabled Muscovy, which inhabited an extremely tough geopolitical neighborhood, surrounded by powerful enemies on all sides (except the north), to survive and expand into a powerful empire. The social contract was renewed under Peter the Great.. it was abandoned as a result of the “gentry revolution” of 1762, when Peter III abolished the service obligations of the noble landowners to the state. By 1860, the nobility had become a parasitic class
The Emancipation Reform of 1861, in particular, pleased neither peasants nor noble serf-owners... This process created huge numbers of counter-elites, which fed the growth of radicals, such as anarchists and social revolutionaries. A wave of terrorist acts roiled Russia during the 1860s and ’70s. Alexander II, who became known as Alexander the Liberator, paid the ultimate price for his liberalization policy—he was assassinated in 1881
* there is no permanent solution. A balanced social system with the wealth pump shut down is an unstable equilibrium that takes constant effort to maintain—like riding a bicycle. This instability is due to one of the most fundamental principles in sociology, the “iron law of oligarchy,”[16] which states that when an interest group acquires a lot of power, it inevitably starts using this power in self-interested ways... The early Russian Empire, for example, was a service state in which everybody served: the peasants, the nobility, and the ruler. (Peter I is a good example of a service tsar but not the only one.) However, the nobility had more power than the other players, and they eventually subverted the tripartite compact by freeing themselves from service. Then they turned on the wealth pump—because they could—oppressing the peasants and becoming a parasitic class. We see the same process, again and again, in all historical states, which is why instability waves always recur.
An even more worrying development is the transition in Western democracies from “class-based party systems” to “multi-elite party systems.” Earlier in the book (chapter 8), we discussed this transition in the United States, where the Democratic Party, a party of the working class during the New Deal, became by 2000 the party of the credentialed 10 percent. The rival party, the Republican Party, primarily served the wealthy 1 percent, leaving the 90 percent out in the cold.
* What is little appreciated is that although democratic institutions are the best (or least bad) way of governing societies, democracies are particularly vulnerable to being subverted by plutocrats. Ideology may be the softest, gentlest form of power, but it is the key one in democratic societies. The plutocrats can use their wealth to buy mass media, to fund think tanks, and to handsomely reward those social influencers who promote their messages.
-------
Although the numerical advantage of the North is four, it actually translates into a warfare advantage of four squared, which is sixteen. This mathematical result is known as Lanchester’s square law.
One of the earliest attempts to express morale in numbers was made by, of all people, the great Russian novelist Leo Tolstoy. Few people realize that Tolstoy’s magisterial opus, War and Peace, which he started writing in 1863, just at the peak of the American Civil War, has a second appendix in which he discusses a science of history.
Jack’s first detailed dissertation proposal to research the relationship between population growth and revolutions was flatly rejected by his graduate committee.
an unusually high frequency of breaks on the left ulna (forearm) are good indicators of violence committed with blunt objects. Just imagine your reaction if someone were about to hit you with a baseball bat. Your arms would likely go up in an attempt to protect your head, and if your attacker was right-handed, you would be hit on the left forearm.